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EXECUTIVE POWER
Trump’s Travel Ban at the Supreme Court: Deference Joined by Nudges Toward Civility
By Peter Margulies  Tuesday, June 26, 2018, 6:32 PM
As I expected, the Supreme Court has upheld President Trump’s travel ban (EO-3). The court’s traditional deference to the president on foreign affairs and national
security drove the 5-4 decision, in which Chief Justice John Roberts (joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito and Neil Gorsuch) rejected
both statutory and constitutional challenges to Proclamation No. 9645, which followed two executive orders. Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy,
concurring in the judgment, offered critics of the ban a bit of a silver lining: The justices sought to nudge the president toward more civil rhetoric and overruled
Korematsu v. United States, the infamous decision upholding the conviction of a U.S. citizen who had failed to comply with a military evacuation order amid the
internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. But the majority rejected claims that the proclamation exceeded the scope of congressional delegation under
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) or violated the Constitution’s Establishment Clause.
On the statute, Chief Justice Roberts asserted that Congress had clearly delegated broad authority to the president under 8 U.S.C. 1182(f). That provision empowers
the president to deny entry to foreign nationals when entry would be “detrimental to the interests of the United States.” According to Roberts, EO-3’s ban on entry of
immigrants from several Muslim-majority countries—including Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria and Yemen—was the product of a neutral interagency process that “sought
to improve vetting procedures” in those countries. The chief justice viewed 1182(f)’s “sweeping” language as suf½cient to authorize measures that retaliated for other
governments’ failure to ensure the ¾ow of information necessary for appropriate consular decisions.
Unfortunately, the majority’s broad view of 1182(f)’s delegation missed its more tailored role in the INA’s overall plan (see the amicus brief for immigration scholars
on which I served as co-counsel with Shoba Wadhia of Penn State and WilmerHale’s Alan Schoenfeld, Ben Gifford and Francisco Unger). In enacting the modern INA
in 1965, Congress assumed that State Department consular of½cers all over the world would apply their expertise and judgment to decisions on visa applications.
Resolving uncertainties in vetting visa applications is part and parcel of consular of½cials’ role. The blanket presidential authority that the majority envisions would
displace that role. Moreover, the authority claimed by Trump lacks any intelligible limits. No prior president has invoked 1182(f) as support for a sweeping bar on
immigration from multiple countries. Expanded to the limits of its logic, the power asserted by the president would swallow up the INA’s entire scheme, including
Congress’s elevation of family reuni½cation to the INA’s “foremost” priority.
That runaway power would also frustrate Congress’s intent in 1965 to decisively reject the national origin quotas that had dominated U.S. immigration law for
decades—quotas roundly denounced by presidents of both parties, including Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. In enacting 8
U.S.C. 1152(a)(1)(A), which bars national-origin discrimination in the issuance of immigrant visas, Congress sought to prevent administrative backsliding toward the
discredited quota regime. Unduly discounting Congress’s intent, Roberts’s anodyne account of EO-3 as a neutral product of interagency review blinked at its arbitrary
singling out of nationals from particular countries that largely share one material attribute: a Muslim-majority population. The INA’s antidiscrimination mandate
makes such stark distinctions the province of Congress, not the executive. 
While the challengers argued that EO-3 clashes with the INA’s antidiscrimination mandate, the majority opinion relied on a formalistic distinction between 1182(f)’s
grant of presidential authority over “entry” of foreign nationals to the United States and 1152(a)(1)(A)’s prohibition on discrimination in issuance of immigrant visas
(see Josh Blackman’s analysis here). According to Roberts, there was no clash between Trump’s broad reading of 1182(f) and the INA’s nondiscrimination provision;
the two provisions occupy “different spheres.” According to this view, visa issuance merely addresses threshold eligibility for a visa, including ascertaining that a visa
applicant is a close relative of his or her sponsor or ½ts within other visa criteria. For Roberts, admissibility concerns a wholly separate inquiry that addresses whether
the applicant has committed a crime, engaged in terrorism, suffers from a communicable disease such as tuberculosis or in any other way runs afoul of express
conditions in the INA.
But Roberts’s analysis arbitrarily bifurcates eligibility and admissibility determinations. Consular of½cials routinely make both determinations before they issue a visa.
And a consular of½cial’s denial of a visa based on national security inadmissibility grounds was the subject of a 2015 decision cited approvingly by the majority: Kerry
v. Din. It’s true that immigration of½cials at U.S. ports of entry can bar admission of newly arriving foreign nationals if those of½cials determine that the noncitizen
has committed a crime or is otherwise inadmissible. As a practical matter, however, this power is triggered only based on new evidence not available to the consular
of½cial who approved the visa. Under the INA, primary responsibility for both eligibility and admissibility decisions resides with consular of½cials. The majority’s
mechanistic distinction ignores this ground truth of immigration practice.
Having rejected the challengers’ statutory argument, the majority also ½nds their constitutional argument unavailing. Here, along with Josh Blackman, I agree with
the Supreme Court’s reasoning. The majority seemed concerned that application of the court’s usual de novo “reasonable observer” approach to the Establishment
Clause would prove “problematic” (p. 32 n. 5) in the unfamiliar context of national security and foreign affairs. The majority was right that caution is prudent in
subjecting national security decisions to the tangled case law of the Establishment Clause, which typically handles disparate matters such as religious displays. Rather
than go this route, which could spill over into judicial intrusion on prerogatives of the political branches, Roberts applied a more deferential rational-basis test. For
the majority, this test was satis½ed by EO-3’s facial neutrality, its inclusion of only 8 percent of the world’s Muslim population, and its inter-agency pedigree and
relation to legitimate national security concerns.
I would have preferred that the Supreme Court avoid the mismatch of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and national security subject matter by holding that EO-3
exceeded Congress’s delegation to the president under the INA. However, I agree with the majority that the risk of structural spillover was too great to enter the
Establishment Clause thicket.
Yet the evidence presented by the plaintiffs in support of their Establishment Clause argument—statements by Trump as both a candidate and as president, including
his campaign advocacy of a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States”— spurred perhaps the most remarkable material in both the
majority opinion and Justice Kennedy’s concurrence. Weighing the president’s comments, Roberts asserted that they did not outweigh the putatively neutral basis for
EO-3. But Roberts seemed to suggest that an even more egregious set of statements, together with a more attenuated national security justi½cation, would fail the
rational-basis test.
Thus far, Roberts had strictly adhered to judicial deference. But here he diverged from that path in citing one of the most celebrated examples of presidential speech:
President George Washington’s reassurance to the Hebrew Congregation of Newport, Rhode Island, that the government of the United States lends “bigotry no
sanction” and “persecution no assistance.” Building on this theme, Roberts next cited President Eisenhower’s vow to congregants at a Washington Islamic Center that
“America would ½ght” for their religious freedom, and George W. Bush’s solemn request after the Sept. 11 attacks that Americans of all faiths understand that “[t]he
face of terror is not the true faith of Islam.” In an implicit but unmistakable allusion to Trump’s rhetoric, Roberts observed with consummate understatement that
presidents and the federal government as a whole have “performed unevenly in living up to those inspiring words.”
In another implicit yet unmistakable reference, this time addressing the Supreme Court’s own checkered history, the majority overruled the court’s infamous decision
in Korematsu. During the presidential campaign, in an exchange that drew substantial attention, then-candidate Trump was distressingly coy when asked whether he
would have supported the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. But here, Roberts labeled the internment “morally repugnant” and pronounced the
court’s decision in Korematsu as “gravely wrong” then and now. Roberts cited Justice Robert Jackson’s dissent, which averred that the internment had “no place in law
under the Constitution.”
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence dovetailed with these themes, noting succinctly that the “oath that all of½cials take to adhere to the Constitution is not con½ned to
those spheres in which the Judiciary can correct or even comment on what those of½cials say or do.” For Kennedy, that absence of judicial oversight made it “all the
more imperative” that each of½cial “adhere to the Constitution and to its meaning and its promise.” Kennedy’s concurrence left little doubt that he would have been
inclined to be more speci½c about Trump’s rhetoric had he occupied a different role.
The Supreme Court’s plea for civility is only dicta, to be sure. It does not compensate for the majority’s failure to recognize that EO-3 clashes with the INA. Nor does it
concretely assist U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents hoping for reuni½cation with family members from countries covered by the travel ban. However, as
Leah Litman has noted, the court’s words reinforce that constitutionalism is ultimately a job for the people themselves.
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